Key research Question
What deterrent strategy is best for the US post-Cold War era, and how can artificial intelligence (AI) improve Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling’s nuclear deterrence theories? Nuclear deterrence entails a security approach based on the core belief that any attack on a power or its allies would trigger a nuclear response (Freedman, 2008; Freedman, 2018; Payne, 2008). There is now justification for instigating conflicts with nations possessing nuclear weapons due to the high costs involved. In a system where both sides have access, to arms the likelihood of all out war actually decreases rather than increases. When one side deploys its weapons against another mutual assured destruction (MAD) becomes the outcome (Freedman, 2008; Freedman, 2018; Payne, 2008). However, MAD appears outdated in the Cold War era.
The purpose of this literature review is to investigate the reasons why the use of artificial intelligence in conjunction with Herman Kahn’s imbalance of terror nuclear strategy is a more effective nuclear deterrence policy for the post-Cold War age than just Thomas Schelling’s balance of terror nuclear scheme, which performed admirably throughout the years of the Cold War (Freedman, 2008; Freedman, 2018; Payne, 2008; Schelling, 2008). A situation known as a balance of terror is one in which the dread of mutual annihilation between nations that possess nuclear weapons serves as a deterrent to military aggression and the use of nuclear weapons. According to Dr. Keith Payne, the opposite position is referred to as an imbalance of terror, and it represents a situation in which a country has a strategic nuclear edge over the competition (Kahn, 2007; Payne, 2008). With the use of artificial intelligence, Kahn’s imbalance of terror will be considerably improved, which will provide the United States with increased nuclear deterrent capabilities against China and Russia (Boden, 2018; Siracusa, 2020).
Theoretical Research Significance
Many theories, including deterrence emphasize the importance of assumptions. Deterrence theory as defined by strategists involves one nation using threats to dissuade another nation from pursuing a course of action (Freedman, 2008; Freedman, 2018; Payne, 2008; Schelling, 2008). Effective deterrence requires conditions to be met. Firstly the leadership of the United States must assume that opposing nations are led by individuals who base their decisions on a cost benefit analysis. If the costs of an attack are low deterrence may not succeed. However it’s uncertain whether this assumption always holds true (Freedman, 2008; Freedman, 2018; Payne, 2008; Schelling, 2008). Secondly a nation must have the capability to endure a strike while retaining nuclear weapons for a retaliatory strike—a concept known as second strike capability. If a country can neutralize all enemy weapons in a strike their adversary would be left defenseless in response. This means that the country must be prepared to launch an attack leading to a nuclear arms race. However long as the weapons competition remains balanced, over time deterrence will still work (Freedman, 2008; Freedman, 2018; Payne, 2008; Schelling, 2008). Additionally, for a states threat to use weapons to be effective it must be believable. An opponent needs to trust that their enemy will indeed deploy their weapons if attacked. How credible can the threat of deploying weapons truly be seen if leaders assume that rival states are actors? To engage in a MAD system a state must be ready to use its arsenal even knowing it would result in its own devastating destruction (Freedman, 2008; Freedman, 2018; Payne, 2008; Schelling, 2008). The paradox of nuclear deterrence theory suggests that adversaries may not be deterred from attacking because they understand it would not make sense for their enemy to respond with retaliation (Freedman, 2008; Freedman, 2018; Payne, 2008; Schelling, 2008).
Practical Research Significance
The deterrent technique that Herman Kahn developed is the one that is both the most practical and significant. Realist Kahn advocated for a “Imbalance of Terror” because he wants the United States to have a military edge with numerous conventional and nuclear weapons (Kahn, 2007; Kahn, 2017; Payne, 2008; Wohlstetter, 2020). Kahn was a realist. Since deterrence is not foolproof, Kahn said that the United States need to have a backup plan. According to Kahn, in order for the United States to successfully and credibly deter the adversary, they need a complete nuclear triad (Kahn, 2007; Kahn, 2017; Payne, 2008; Wohlstetter, 2020). It is necessary for Kahn to have a versatile assortment of conventional and nuclear weapons in order to deter the adversary. For the sake of preserving the national security of the United States, Kahn want to have a variety of alternatives available for the United States’ strategies, tactics, and fighting procedures (Kahn, 2007; Kahn, 2017; Payne, 2008; Wohlstetter, 2010). The nuclear deterrent goals that Kahn has to attain will be accomplished by A.I.
There are three types of nuclear prevention strategies proposed by Herman Kahn, namely Type I (Deterrence, by Punishment) Type II (Deterrence by Denial) and Type III (Deterrence by the Threat of Escalation) (Freedman, 2019; Payne, 2008; Kahn, 2007; Wohlstetter, 2010). Artificial intelligence has the potential to enhance these strategies. Type I, which focuses on deterrence through punishment could benefit from AI advancements. By improving the precision and efficiency of nuclear retaliation systems using AI it becomes possible to monitor threats devise optimal response plans and execute strategies with accuracy (Freedman, 2019; Payne 2008; Geist, 2023; Boulanin, 2019). This enhances the credibility of punishment. Strengthens deterrence. Similarly AI can enhance Type II deterrence through denial by strengthening systems. Predicting threat trajectories detecting attacks and coordinating measures are all areas where AI can play a significant role, in making enemy assaults more difficult to execute effectively thereby increasing deterrence levels (Freedman, 2019; Payne 2008; Geist, 2023; Boulanin, 2019). Artificial intelligence has the capability to enhance Type III deterrence through the potential of escalation. This can be achieved by AIs capacity to offer timely information on an adversarys actions and intentions (Boden, 2018; Siracusa, 2020; Geist, 2023; Boulanin, 2019). AI systems can analyze data to detect signs of escalation providing decision makers with the insights, for effective responses. Consequently the threat of escalation would become more credible leading to an enhancement in deterrence. The use of intelligence in deterrence raises several ethical and practical concerns, including the risk of unintended escalation, vulnerability of AI systems, to hacking and the potential deployment of autonomous weapons using AI technology (Boden, 2018; Siracusa, 2020; Geist, 2023; Boulanin, 2019). It is crucial to highlight that these issues need consideration.
Conceptual or Theoretical Framework Assignment
The theoretical and conceptual frameworks for artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and nuclear deterrent techniques are very extensive and intricate. In order to comprehend artificial intelligence, one must first understand it as a system that is capable of executing activities that would normally need the participation of human intellect. Artificial intelligence is a field of study that focuses on the development of computers that are capable of thinking, learning, and making choices (Boden, 2018; Siracusa, 2020). To improve capabilities, the United States government’s current foreign policy is progressively utilizing artificial intelligence in a variety of fields, including military and security (Boden, 2018; Siracusa, 2020; Geist, 2023; Boulanin, 2019). As part of the conceptual framework for cybersecurity, the protection of computer systems and networks against the disclosure of information, theft of information, or damage comes into play. From a theoretical standpoint, it is about the management of risks and the implementation of preventative activities. As the number of cyberattacks and threats continues to rise, the United States government’s foreign policy is becoming more focused on enhancing cybersecurity. Game theory and the idea of mutually assured destruction are the foundations upon which Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling have built their nuclear deterrent plans (Payne 2008; Khan, 2007; Schelling, 2008). He suggested the “ladder of escalation,” which is a 44-rung ladder of aggressiveness, beginning with an apparent crisis and ending with nuclear war (Kahn, 2007; Kahn, 2017; Payne, 2008) Kahn was a military planner (Playne, 2008). Schelling, an economist, directed his attention on the tactic of compellence, which involves using threats in order to influence the behavior of an adversary (Payne, 2008). However, the current foreign policy of the United States places an emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament while still maintaining nuclear deterrence (Freedman, 2013; Freedman, 2018; Freedman, 2019; Payne, 2008). There is a close relationship between these frameworks and tactics when it comes to the topic of national security. When it comes to sustaining nuclear deterrent and mitigating dangers associated with it, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity are becoming more critical. As a means of addressing these interrelated difficulties, the United States’ foreign policy continues to undergo development (Freedman, 2013; Freedman, 2018; Freedman, 2019; Payne, 2008).
Artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and nuclear deterrent plans may all have conceptual and theoretical frameworks that make them highly complicated. Understanding the capabilities and limits of artificial intelligence is at the heart of the conceptual foundation for AI. In theory, artificial intelligence is predicated on the concept that robots are capable of imitating human intellect. Skills like as learning, thinking, problem-solving, perception, and language comprehension are included in this classification. When it comes to cybersecurity, having a conceptual framework that encompasses comprehending the many risks, vulnerabilities, and controls that exist in a digital world is essential. A number of different models and concepts of information security, such as the CIA triad, serve as the foundation for the theoretical framework. Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn were two of the first people to work in this area. Kahn’s approach for deterrence was founded on the idea of “escalation,” in which he envisioned a ladder consisting of 44 rungs of escalation, ranging from a minor dispute to a full-scale nuclear war. Schelling’s method, on the other hand, was founded on game theory (Kahn, 2007; Kahn, 2017; Payne, 2008). He claimed that deterrence may be accomplished by a strategy of mutually assured destruction, which stands for mutually guaranteed devastation (Kahn, 2007; Kahn, 2017; Payne, 2008). Consequently, the subject of the dissertation would require doing an in-depth investigation of the ways in which developments in artificial intelligence and cybersecurity have the potential to affect or disrupt conventional nuclear deterrent methods. This would be accomplished by studying the impact of AI and cybersecurity on nuclear deterrence techniques in United States policy. It would require assessing the policies that are now in place in the United States and making suggestions for the future.
Comparing and Contrasting Divergent Perspectives
One of the subjects, for this dissertation would involve comparing and contrasting the differing viewpoints of Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling on policy issues related to artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and nuclear deterrence strategies. Some individuals support the use of intelligence in national security matters while others oppose it (Franzman, 2021; Geist, 2023; Johnson, 2021; Johnson, 2023) . Advocates of AI argue that it can enhance security by improving risk assessment, decision making processes and military efficiency. Conversely there are concerns about weapons risks, privacy infringements and potential malicious uses of AI technology. Various opinions exist on how to protect security, in the digital age. While some experts advocate for increased government oversight and monitoring of the internet and digital systems others favor a hands off approach that emphasizes private sector innovation and self regulation (Franzman, 2021; Geist, 2023; Johnson, 2021; Johnson, 2023). Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling held differing views on nuclear deterrence strategies. Kahn, a strategist believed that maintaining a nuclear arsenal was crucial to deter potential adversaries. A concept known as “escalation dominance,” where the United States holds the ability to escalate a confrontation at any level was highlighted as one of his arguments (Kahn, 2007; Kahn, 2017; Payne, 2008). The economist Schelling emphasized the importance of strategy and negotiation, in the deterrence process. He believed that the threat of destruction could deter war (Payne, 2008; Schelling, 2008). When exploring a policy issue related to the United States different perspectives can offer insights. For example in discussions about intelligence and national security one could examine how the U.S. is balancing the benefits of AI with risks (Freedman, 2013; Freedman, 2018; Freedman, 2019; Payne, 2008). Similarly in cybersecurity there is a focus on how the U.S.’s managing the tension between government oversight and innovation in companies (Freedman, 2013; Freedman, 2018; Freedman, 2019; Payne, 2008). Concerning deterrence there is growing interest in researching and understanding how the U.S. is dealing with Kahn and Schellings strategies, which have been impacting the Cold War and post-Cold War eras (Freedman, 2013; Freedman, 2018; Freedman, 2019; Payne, 2008).
Research Synthesis
The United States of America has been a world leader in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and nuclear weapons (Akart, 2016; Boden, 2018; Siracusa, 2020; Brooks, 2018). A number of measures have been put into place by the government in order to encourage innovation, safeguard intellectual property, and guarantee national security. In addition, the United States of America has a lengthy history of developing nuclear deterrent methods, with Herman Kahn and Thomas Schelling being two of the most influential members of this profession (Freedman, 2013; Freedman, 2018; Freedman, 2019; Payne, 2008). In contrast to Schelling’s methods, which highlighted the significance of credible threats and bargaining leverage, Kahn’s plans centered on the unimaginable catastrophes that would result from a nuclear war (Freedman, 2013; Freedman, 2018; Freedman, 2019; Payne, 2008). Artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and nuclear deterrence are not specifically addressed in the Sacred and Holy Scriptures. Nevertheless, there are guiding ideals that may be used, such as stewardship, justice, and peace. Stewardship entails the responsible use of technology, justice necessitates the implementation of policies that are fair and ethical, and peace is congruent with the objective of deterrence techniques, which are designed to avoid conflict (Marsden, 1997; Woodhead, 2004) . Artificial intelligence and cybersecurity are instruments that can be used to preserve national security and economic competitiveness from the standpoint of United States policy (Akart, 2016; Boden, 2018; Siracusa, 2020; Brooks, 2018).. Deterrence tactics for nuclear weapons are designed to avert the terrible outcomes that would result from a nuclear conflict. According to the teachings of the Sacred and Holy Bible, these need to be followed in a manner that fosters stewardship, justice, and peace (Anderson & Clark, 2017; Rae, 2018; Payne, 2008). The research synthesis will provide support for the responsible and ethical use of artificial intelligence and cybersecurity, as well as a nuclear policy that places an emphasis on peace and minimizes damage.
Literature Review and Overview
Schelling, T. C. (2008). Arms and influence. Yale University Press.
A landmark book in the area of international relations and strategic studies, Arms and Influence by Thomas Schelling is especially important when considering nuclear strategy as a background for the study of these subjects (Schelling, 2008). Coercive diplomacy, deterrence, credibility of threats, brinkmanship, and limited conflict are some of the primary ideas and concepts that are discussed throughout the book from beginning to end. Schelling contends that the fundamental objective of military might, and especially nuclear power, is not to win wars but rather to exert influence on the actions of other governments (Schelling, 2008). The term “coercive diplomacy” is what he refers to as this. In negotiations, the use of the threat of force may be a very effective weapon (Schelling, 2008). One of the most influential thinkers in the field of nuclear deterrence is Schelling. Instead of being used to fight conflicts, he contends that the aim of nuclear weapons is to prevent aggression from occurring (Schelling, 2008). Considering the immense devastating force of nuclear weapons, it seems inconceivable that they could ever be used in any way, which serves to discourage possible aggressors. If leaders want to be successful in deterrence, then their threat of reprisal has to be believable. Despite the fact that this may require governments to do measures that seem to be illogical, Schelling contends that states have a responsibility to persuade their opponents that they are prepared to use nuclear weapons if it becomes essential to do so (Schelling, 2008). This is a tactic that involves bringing a potentially hazardous circumstance to the point where it is on the borderline of catastrophe in order to get the most favorable conclusion possible. It is the process of fabricating a realistic threat of war in order to coerce an enemy into retreating from position. Schelling also examines the idea of limited war, which refers to a conflict in which the parties involved limit the kinds of weaponry and military strategies that they use in their battle (Schelling, 2008). It is his contention that even in an era dominated by nuclear weapons, there is still potential for limited warfare (Schelling, 2008). The strategic use of force as an instrument of statecraft is the overarching concept that is discussed across these differences of opinion. Instead of seeing military force, and nuclear power in particular, as a tool of destruction, Schelling sees it as a method of influence. Both the academic discipline of strategic studies and the area of international relations have been profoundly impacted by this point of view. Thus, reading this book provided scholars and analysts with a number of important takeaways, the most important of which are the following: coercive diplomacy, the negotiating power of nuclear weapons, commitment and credibility, strategy of conflict, and the value of communication (Schelling, 2008).
Roberts, B. (2016). The case for U.S. nuclear weapons in the 21st century. Stanford University Press.
Brad Roberts book, The Case, for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the Century delves into the role of weapons in the United States national security policy (Roberts, 2016). The author discusses aspects such as deterrence, arsenal modernization, strategic stability, extended deterrence and adapting to emerging threats (Roberts, 2016). According to Roberts nuclear weapons are crucial for deterring adversaries from launching attacks. He emphasizes the importance of maintaining a arsenal to prevent such threats. Roberts also highlights the necessity of updating the outdated Cold War era arsenal to address challenges (Roberts, 2016). Additionally, he stresses the significance of stability. A state where nations have no incentive to initiate a conflict. Roberts advocates for efforts to maintain stability, with nuclear armed countries. Roberts also delves into the concept of deterrence which refers to the United States commitment, to defending its allies using weapons if necessary (Roberts, 2016). He argues that this plays a role in Americas policy (Roberts, 2016). According to Roberts the U.S. Government must adjust its strategy to address emerging risks like the spread of weapons to rogue states and the threat of nuclear terrorism (Roberts, 2016). These are topics among strategists who believe that maintaining nuclear capabilities is vital, for national security. Various points are raised in favor of deterrence enhancing the arsenal ensuring strategic stability emphasizing long term deterrence and adapting to new challenges (Roberts, 2016). The book imparts several crucial insights to researchers and analysts. These include recognizing the significance of nuclear deterrence, understanding the necessity of a customized deterrence strategy, acknowledging the role of non-nuclear capabilities, appreciating the importance of allies and partners, advocating for a balanced approach to arms control, and recognizing the challenges associated with nuclear modernization (Roberts, 2016).
Freedman, L. (2008). Deterrence. Polity Press.
Lawrence Freedman’s book Deterrence is widely recognized as a groundbreaking work, in the fields of relations and strategic studies (Freedman, 2008). The book delves into concepts such as deterrence, rational decision making, the credibility of threats, uncertainty and risk the role of communication and the limitations of deterrence (Freedman, 2008). Freedman argues that deterrence goes beyond the fear of retaliation; it also involves convincing an adversary that the costs of an action outweigh its benefits (Freedman, 2008). The importance of deterrence in preventing conflicts is a topic frequently explored by strategists who stress its significance. According to Freedman effective deterrence relies on all parties involved making decisions based on an evaluation of costs and benefits. Other nuclear strategists like Thomas Schelling have also highlighted this theme in their writings (Freedman, 2008). Credibility is emphasized by Freedman as crucial in the process of deterrence; a credible threat of retaliation is essential for deterrence a view shared by experts in nuclear strategy (Freedman, 2008). In his analysis within the realm of deterrence Freedman examines how uncertainty and risk factor, into decision making processes. He argues that ambiguity can serve as a tactic, for deterrence by keeping the outcomes of aggression uncertain (Freedman, 2008). Several other nuclear strategists have also explored concepts making it a recurring theme in their works. Freedman sheds light on the role of communication in the effectiveness of deterrence. To achieve success it is vital to communicate both intentions and capabilities. This recurring motif is evident, in the writings of strategists. Furthermore Freedman discusses the limitations of deterrence acknowledging that it cannot prevent all conflicts and may at times escalate tensions (Freedman, 2008). This aspect is also touched upon by strategists in their analyses. The themes discussed in Freedman’s Deterrence are commonly addressed by strategists, including the importance of communication, rationality, credibility and the boundaries of deterrence (Freedman, 2008). The book imparts crucial insights to researchers and analysts, including comprehension of deterrence, the progressive development of deterrence theory, practical applications of deterrence, critical evaluations of deterrence, and prospects for the future of deterrence (Freedman, 2008).
Freedman, L. (2018). Nuclear deterrence. Penguin Random House UK.
In the fields of international relations and strategic studies, the book Nuclear Deterrence written by Lawrence Freedman is considered to be a revolutionary piece of literature (Freedman, 2018). The role of deterrence, rational actors, the stability-instability paradox, the problem of proliferation, the importance of communication, and the uncertainty of deterrence are some of the major arguments and common themes that are frequently discussed in relation to this book and other works by nuclear strategists (Freedman, 2018). Others include the importance of communication. The argument put up by Freedman is that nuclear weapons have been of great assistance in the preservation of peace, notably during the time of the Cold War (Freedman, 2018). The notion of “mutually assured destruction” is often discussed among nuclear strategists, who frequently debate this topic (Freedman, 2018). This term refers to the belief that the threat of deploying powerful weapons against the opponent precludes the enemy from using those same weapons. Like a great number of other strategists, Freedman operates on the assumption that governments are rational actors (Freedman, 2018). This indicates that they will behave in a manner that is beneficial to them and will refrain from doing acts that might result in their demise. The theory of deterrence is based on this premise as its foundation (Freedman, 2018). In this book, Freedman explores the contradiction that nuclear weapons offer stability at a strategic level by averting large-scale battles, but they might also generate instability at lesser levels by promoting local conflicts since nuclear-armed governments fear escalation to nuclear use (Freedman, 2018). In addition to this, Freedman discusses the problem of nuclear proliferation. He contends that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a greater number of nations has the potential to disrupt the international order, a viewpoint that is held by a large number of other nuclear strategists (Freedman, 2018). For the purpose of avoiding misunderstandings and errors in judgment that may result in nuclear war, Freedman places a strong emphasis on the significance of communication between governments that possess nuclear weapons. In the body of work that has been done on nuclear strategy, this is a recurring subject (Freedman, 2018). The inherent unpredictability of deterrence is something that Freedman admits. Due to the fact that we are unable to know what would have occurred in the absence of deterrence, it is difficult to know for certain whether or not it is effective. Some nuclear strategists think that leaders may deduce the efficiency of deterrence from historical facts, which is a matter of disagreement among those who work in the field of nuclear strategy (Freedman, 2018).
Delpech, T. (2012). Nuclear deterrence in the 21st century. RAND Corporation.
The book Nuclear Deterrence, in the 21st Century by Therese Delpech provides an exploration of the role nuclear weapons play in todays world (Delpech, 2012). Various nuclear strategists share arguments and recurring themes, such as the relevance of nuclear deterrence the risks associated with proliferation the importance of rationality the necessity for arms control the impact of technology and the value of diplomacy (Delpech, 2012). Delpech argues that despite the end of the Cold War nuclear deterrence remains a component of international security strategies. This viewpoint aligns with that of strategists who believe that nuclear weapons still serve to prevent conflicts among powerful nations. Delpech highlights the dangers associated with the spread of weapons in unstable regions (Delpech, 2012). Concerns about proliferation among state actors and rogue governments are frequently raised by strategists focusing on this issue (Delpech, 2012). According to Delpech and numerous other strategists logic plays a role, in nuclear deterrence effectiveness. They argue that deterrence works best when leaders act rationally. Delpech highlights the importance of arms control agreements, in maintaining stability a topic frequently discussed by strategists (Delpech, 2012). They view arms control as a tool for managing and reducing the risks associated with weapons. Delpech also delves into how advancements in technology such as missile defense systems and precision guided missiles impact the spread of nuclear deterrence strategies. As technology evolves many nuclear strategists grapple with this issue (Delpech, 2012). In addressing threats Delpech underscores the value of diplomacy a viewpoint shared by strategists who see diplomacy as key to averting nuclear conflict. Delpechs book aligns with the perspectives of strategists by emphasizing the ongoing importance of nuclear deterrence risks of proliferation, role of rationality necessity, for arms control, impact of technology advancements and significance of diplomatic efforts (Delpech, 2012).
Narang, V. (2014). Nuclear strategy in the modern era: Regional Powers and International Conflict. Princeton University Press.
The book Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era written by Vipin Narang is an important addition to the topic of nuclear strategy by virtue of its content. stance theory, catalytic stance, guaranteed retaliation posture, asymmetric escalation posture, regional powers’ nuclear strategy, deterrence theory, and case studies are some of the primary points and common topics that are discussed throughout the book. Narang presents the idea of “posture theory,” which classifies nations into three distinct categories according to their nuclear postures (Narang, 2014). These categories include catalytic, guaranteed retaliation, and asymmetric escalation. States that depend on a third party for their security are the ones who adopt the catalytic stance. Through the use of their nuclear weapons, they are able to elicit aid from a more powerful country (Narang, 2014). The assured retaliation posture is taken by governments that have the objective of preventing nuclear and conventional assaults by ensuring that they have the capacity to respond with a secure second strike (Narang, 2014). The asymmetric escalation posture is taken by governments that utilize nuclear weapons to prevent conventional assaults. According to this posture, these states threaten to escalate any confrontation to the level of nuclear warfare. In his book, Narang makes the argument that the nuclear strategies of regional powers are not driven by the abstract logic of nuclear deterrence but rather by the unique security contexts and dangers that they encounter (Narang, 2014). Putting up the argument that the standard theory of deterrence does not fully explain the nuclear plans of regional powers, Narang questions the validity of this theory. In order to demonstrate his points, Narang provides a detailed examination of the nuclear tactics used by nine nuclear-armed nations via the use of case studies drawn from those governments(Narang, 2014). The need of understanding the distinct security settings and dangers faced by nuclear-armed nations, the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence, and the requirement for a secure second-strike capability are some of the topics that are shared by Narang’s book and all of the other books written by nuclear strategists. The work of Narang, on the other hand, is distinguished from that of other nuclear strategists by the fact that he places a strong focus on the variety of nuclear postures and challenges the conventional idea of deterrence (Narang, 2014).
Payne, K. B. (2008). The Great American Gamble. National Institute Press.
With regard to the study of nuclear strategy, The Great American Gamble by Dr. Keith Payne is considered to be an important book (Payne, 2008). The deterrence theory, the danger of nuclear war, the function of nuclear weapons, a criticism of arms control, strategic defense, and strategic defense are some of the primary issues and recurring topics that are discussed throughout the book (Payne, 2008). Payne contends that the notion of nuclear deterrence is not universally applicable to all situations. Instead, it need to be developed in accordance with the particular dangers and conditions that a nation is confronted with (Payne, 2008). He highlights the significance of understanding the adversary’s perspectives and the reasons behind their actions (Payne, 2008). According to Payne, the probability of nuclear war is not constant but rather shifts depending on the many strategic environments that exist (Payne, 2008). In addition to urging a state of perpetual awareness and the modification of nuclear policy, he cautions against becoming complacent. The Function of Nuclear Weapons: As far as Payne is concerned, nuclear weapons are an essential component in the process of preserving peace and stability (Payne, 2008). He contends that the concept of full nuclear disarmament is not feasible, noting that it might result in an increase in the number of conventional battles (Payne, 2008). Payne provides a criticism of the approach to weapons control, stating that it often fails to address the underlying causes of conflict and may sometimes make other security challenges much more difficult to solve (Payne, 2008). As an additional measure to complement nuclear deterrence, Payne is a supporter for the development of strategic defense systems. He is of the opinion that such systems have the potential to improve deterrence by prohibiting enemies from gaining the advantages of a first strike (Payne, 2008). When compared to the ideas of other nuclear strategists, Payne’s views have certain similarities while also exhibiting some variations. The emphasis that Payne places on customized deterrence and the significance of knowing the opponent is shared by a significant number of strategizing experts. His support for strategic defense systems and his pessimism about weapons control are, however, the subject of disagreement among certain individuals (Payne, 2008). The argument that they are making is that these viewpoints might result in weapons races and enhance the likelihood of a nuclear conflict (Payne, 2008).
Kahn, H. (2007). On thermonuclear war. Transaction Publishers.
The book On Thermonuclear War by Herman Kahn is widely regarded as a work in the field of strategy. It delves into concepts such as deterrence, limited nuclear conflict, escalation ladder, survival strategies and the rationale behind war (Kahn, 2007). According to Kahn, the way to prevent nuclear war is through deterrence. Many experts in nuclear strategy advocate for maintaining a arsenal to deter other nations from initiating a nuclear showdown (Kahn, 2007). The notion of a “conflict” was introduced by Kahn suggesting that such a scenario could be managed without leading to global catastrophe (Kahn, 2007). This idea sparked debates among many who believed any war would inevitably result in disaster. Kahn also introduced the concept of an “escalation ladder” outlining the stages that could potentially escalate from warfare to scale nuclear conflict. This idea has found acceptance in strategic studies circles (Kahn, 2007; Kahn, 2017). Additionally Kahn emphasized the importance of defense and survival strategies as preparations, in case of a potential nuclear war (Kahn, 2007). He argued that civilization could potentially recover from a conflict and rebuild itself (Kahn, 2007). According to Kahns theory nuclear warfare could be analyzed logically similar, to any form of engagement (Kahn, 2007). This perspective diverged from the ethical arguments typically associated with discussions on war. Other nuclear strategists like Thomas Schelling and Henry Kissinger also explore concepts of deterrence, escalation and the potential for conflicts touching upon similar themes as discussed here. However Kahns focus on survival and his rational approach, towards the topic of warfare stood out as a perspective that has significantly influenced the field of nuclear strategy (Kahn, 2007).
Kahn, H. (2017). On escalation metaphors and scenarios. Routledge.
From the perspective of nuclear strategy, the book On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios written by Herman Kahn is considered to be a landmark work (Kahn, 2017). The escalation dominance, the escalation ladder, the nuclear war scenarios, the deterrence theory, and the rationality in conflict are some of the primary points and common topics that are highlighted throughout this book (Kahn, 2017). Kahn is the one who first presented the idea of “escalation dominance,” which represents the capacity of a state to possess superior power at each degree of conflict intensity, hence inhibiting an enemy from escalating the fight (Kahn, 2017). The “ladder of escalation” that Kahn envisaged consisted of 44 rungs, ranging from seeming calm to full-scale nuclear war (Kahn, 2017). The ladder was designed to emphasize that there are many different levels of warfare and that escalation is neither automatic nor inevitable (Kahn, 2017). One of the first people to talk the unfathomable, Kahn was one of the first people to consider the idea of surviving a nuclear war (Kahn, 2017). The argument that he made was that nuclear war may have varied degrees of destructiveness and that it was not definitely the end of everything. Kahn pushed for a more nuanced view of conflict and deterrence, and he criticized the classic deterrence theory for its binary character, which states that there is either complete war or peace (Kahn, 2017). In his speech, Kahn highlighted that reasonable judgments are made even during times of conflict. Having a grasp of this reasoning, he suggested, might be beneficial in terms of managing disputes and reducing the escalation of such conflicts. Comparisons are often made between the works of Kahn and those of Thomas Schelling and Albert Wohlstetter. Schelling, much like Kahn, placed a strong emphasis on the significance of strategy in nuclear deterrent; nevertheless, he was more concerned with the psychological components of deterrence. Wohlstetter, on the other hand, underlined the need of preserving a secure second-strike capacity in order to guarantee deterrence (Wohlstetter, 2020). The work of Kahn is distinguished by the fact that it focuses on the gradations of conflict, the likelihood of surviving a nuclear war, and the rationality of decision-making in the context of peacetime combat. The academic discipline of nuclear strategy has been significantly impacted as a result of his work.
Freedman, L. (2019). The evolution of nuclear strategy. Palgrave Macmillian.
Lawrence Freedman’s book, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy holds importance in the realms of relations and nuclear strategy studies (Freedman, 2019). The book delves into concepts such, as the evolution of nuclear strategy deterrence theory, limited nuclear war, arms control and the impact of technology. Beginning from World War II and spanning through the Cold War era Freedman traces the evolution of strategy over time. He argues that nuclear strategy has evolved from an approach called ” retaliation” to a more complex strategy known as “flexible response” (Freedman, 2019). Deterrence theory revolves around the notion that the fear of reprisal serves as a deterrent, against enemy aggression. Freedman explores deterrence as an unpredictable tactic hinging on how adversaries perceive and reason(Freedman, 2019). Additionally he delves into the concept of warfare where controlled use of nuclear weapons is contemplated within confined parameters (Freedman, 2019). He argues that this concept faces challenges because it assumes that managing and advancing a war can be done in an predictable manner (Freedman, 2019). In the realm of strategy Freedman delves into the importance of weapons control. He believes that arms control plays a role, in strategy as it can reduce the chances of a nuclear conflict and maintain strategic stability. Freedman underscores the impact of technology on shaping policy. He suggests that technological advancements have led to changes in strategy, such as shifting from bomber based to missile based forces (Freedman, 2019). Various aspects like the evolution of strategy, deterrence principles, limited nuclear warfare concepts, arms control significance and technology’s effect on strategy are explored by different experts in the field. However what sets Freedmans work apart is its historical approach, to the discussed issues (Freedman, 2019).
Marsden, G. M. (1997). The outrageous idea of Christian Scholarship. Oxford University Press.
George M. Marsdens book, The Idea of Christian Scholarship adds a perspective, to the ongoing dialogue on the intersection of religious faith and scholarly pursuits. Marsden argues for the integration of perspectives into discussions emphasizing the importance of merging religious beliefs with intellectual endeavors rather than compartmentalizing them (Marsden, 1997). He advocates for diversity within academia suggesting that educational institutions should embrace a variety of viewpoints including those rooted in religion to enrich discourse and deepen our understanding of subjects (Marsden, 1997). Marsden highlights Christianity’s influence on thought and culture cautioning against a biased interpretation of history and culture that may arise from excluding Christian ideas from academic conversations (Marsden, 1997). He addresses the bias, against Christianity in circles noting that while other viewpoints are welcomed Christian perspectives are often marginalized or overlooked despite their validity. Marsden argues that studying Christianity offers a perspective that can enrich discussions (Marsden, 1997). He suggests that Christian scholars bring insights to topics such, as ethics and human nature. Marsden believes it is important for academics of faith to integrate their beliefs into their work not just study them academically (Marsden, 1997). His book encourages the inclusion of perspectives in academia promoting the blending of religion with research embracing diversity in settings and acknowledging Christianity’s influence, on Western intellectual traditions (Marsden, 1997).
Hazony, Y. (2018). On the virtue of nationalism. Basic Books.
Yoram Hazonys book The Virtue of Nationalism presents an argument supporting nationalism as a framework (Harzony, 2018). Hazony contrasts nationalism with imperialism favoring the idea that allowing states to govern themselves independently’s preferable, to seeking global unity under a single rule (Harzony, 2018). He argues that nationalism is the way to govern the world emphasizing that nation states promote individual freedom, societal order and political stability. By focusing on shared culture, language and values nation states create a sense of belonging and identity that other systems cannot replicate (Harzony, 2018). Hazony suggests that the roots of nationalism can be traced back to the Old Testament, in the Holy Bible, where he sees a model of freedom and responsibility among people that has influenced the formation of nation states. Ideologies, like internationalism and globalism face criticism from Hazony due to their perceived threat to the sovereignty and independence of nation states (Harzony, 2018).. He argues that these ideologies often lead to imperialism and hinder nations ability to determine their fate. Hazony emphasizes the importance of preserving identity and cultural heritage contrary to some opponents claims that they fuel discord. He believes that these elements actually foster unity and trust among individuals (Harzony, 2018). According to Hazony a world dominated by universalist ideologies or empires is less likely to uphold peace compared to a world where nations have the freedom to develop independently(Harzony, 2018). He advocates for respect among states stating that peaceful coexistence and collaboration are achievable when governments honor each others sovereignty (Harzony, 2018). While some Christian theologians and security experts support Hazonys stance on nationalism others critique it for its simplicity or potential drawbacks leading to disagreements, within these communities.
Geist, E. (2023). Deterrence under uncertainty: Artificial intelligence and nuclear warfare. Oxford University Press.
Deterrence under Uncertainty: Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Warfare is a book written by Dr. Edward Geist that is an important addition to the subject of national security studies (Geist, 2023). Uncertainty and deterrence, artificial intelligence and decision making, artificial intelligence and nuclear stability, ethical and legal issues, and policy suggestions are some of the primary points and recurring topics that can be found throughout Geist’s body of work. In his argument, Geist contends that the lack of clarity about the capabilities and intents of artificial intelligence systems might potentially weaken nuclear deterrence (Geist, 2023). Deterrence is dependent on clear communication and a knowledge of capabilities and intentions, both of which are difficult to achieve with artificial intelligence owing to the inherent unpredictability of the technology (Geist, 2023). Using artificial intelligence, Geist investigates how decision-making processes in nuclear warfare may be altered (Geist, 2023). It is his contention that artificial intelligence has the capacity to make judgments more quickly and maybe with more precision than humans, but that this speed may also result in escalation and incorrect calculations (Geist, 2023). Geist explores the influence that artificial intelligence has on the stability of nuclear power. He thinks that artificial intelligence might either improve or destroy stability(Geist, 2023). AI may, for instance, improve early warning systems, which would ultimately lead to increased stability (Geist, 2023). On the other hand, it may also make it possible for new kinds of assaults that weaken the stability of the system (Geist, 2023). In addition to this, Geist investigates the moral and legal repercussions that may result from using AI in nuclear warfare (Geist, 2023). The potential for autonomous weapons to breach international law is one of the issues that he brings up, along with considerations around responsibility and control. Geist offers some policy proposals for the management of the hazards linked with artificial intelligence and nuclear warfare (Geist, 2023). The promotion of openness, the establishment of standards and rules, and the investment in research to better comprehend the consequences of artificial intelligence for nuclear weapons are some of these goals (Geist, 2023). These topics are relevant to larger debates in the area of nuclear strategy, notably those that revolve around the difficulties posed by developing technology, the need of clear communication and comprehension in the context of deterrence, and the requirement for policy responses to effectively manage new dangers.
Boulanin, V. (2019). The impact of artificial intelligence on strategic stability and nuclear risk. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
A detailed investigation of the possible effects that artificial intelligence technologies may have on nuclear security and strategic stability is presented in the book titled The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, which was written by Vincent Boulanin. AI and strategic stability, AI and nuclear danger, AI and arms race, and the necessity for regulation are the primary arguments and topics that are discussed throughout this book. For Boulanin, artificial intelligence has the potential to both strengthen and weaken strategic stability (Boulanin, 2019). Artificial intelligence has the potential to enhance early warning and decision-making systems, hence lowering the probability of an accidental nuclear war occurring. On the other side, artificial intelligence may potentially enhance the likelihood of escalation happening as a result of erroneous perceptions and computations (Boulanin, 2019). According to the book, artificial intelligence has the potential to raise nuclear hazards in a number of different ways. For example, artificial intelligence might make it possible to develop new capabilities for the delivery and defense of nuclear weapons, which could possibly upset the balance of power. The potential for cyber assaults on nuclear command and control systems might potentially be increased by artificial intelligence (Boulanin, 2019). Given that nations can be driven to develop artificial intelligence capabilities for military objectives, Boulanin warns of the possibility of an artificial intelligence arms race, which might possibly lead to an unstable security environment. The book places a strong emphasis on the need of international regulation in order to effectively control the hazards that are linked with artificial intelligence in the nuclear arena. Boulanin proposes that governments should work together to establish standards and guidelines for the use of artificial intelligence in nuclear weapons systems (Boulanin, 2019). These issues are in line with the larger conversation that is taking place among nuclear strategists, who are becoming more worried about the implications of developing technologies for nuclear security and strategic stability (Boulanin, 2019). In addition to this, they stress the need of international collaboration and regulation in order to effectively manage these risks (Boulanin, 2019).
Synthesis of Common Themes
The researchers that are discussed in this literature review have a variety of perspectives on topics such as Christian ethics, foreign policy of the United States of America, nuclear deterrent, advanced technology, and national security (Delpech, 2012). The significance of national security as a basic obligation of the state is something that is universally acknowledged by all of them (Delpech, 2012). They say that the state is obligated to protect its people from dangers that come from the outside and to keep the state’s internal order intact. With regard to nuclear deterrence, the majority of these scholars and researchers, in particular Thomas Schelling, Brad Roberts, Lawrence Freedman, Keith Paynes, and Herman Kahn, have generated a significant amount of written material. In general, they are in agreement that nuclear weapons have a deterrent effect, which means that they discourage prospective rivals from starting a confrontation (Delpech, 2012). On the other hand, they are aware of the dangers and moral conundrums that are connected to nuclear weapons (Delpech, 2012). Conversations from George M. Marsden and Yoram Hazony over the function of Christian ethics in the realms of politics and international affairs (Marsden, 1997; Hazony, 2018). They contend that political choices, especially those pertaining to matters of national security and nuclear deterrence, need to be guided by Christian concepts such as love, justice, and peace (Marsden, 1997; Hazony, 2018). There is a consensus among these scholars on the significance of national security and the need for a robust defense (Delpech, 2012; Hazony, 2018; Marsden, 1997). They often talk about the need of striking a balance between freedom and security, as well as the role that the state plays in defending its inhabitants (Delpech, 2012; Hazony, 2018; Marsden, 1997). A significant amount of literature on nuclear deterrence has been produced by scholars such as Thomas Schelling and Brad Roberts. Generally speaking, they contend that the possibility of nuclear retaliation has been crucial in preserving peace and preventing major hostilities since the end of World War II. In their research, Vincent Boulanin and Edward Geist have investigated the effects that technological advancements might have on the nation’s security (Boulanin, 2019; Geist, 2023). The potential dangers and advantages of technology like as artificial intelligence and autonomous weaponry are often brought up in their conversations (Boulanin, 2019; Geist, 2023). A significant number of these researchers have provided criticism of the United States’ foreign policy. A few of authors, such as Lawrence Freedman and Vipin Narang, have written on the difficulties associated with managing international relations in a world that is both complicated and constantly changing (Freedman, 2013; Freedman, 2018; Freedman, 2019; Narang, 2014). Yoram Hazony and George M. Marsden have conducted research on the topic of the role that Christian ethics have in politics and society (Marsden, 1997; Hazony, 2018). The friction that exists between secular and religious principles, as well as the impact that Christian thinking has had on Western culture, is a topic that scholars often debate (Marsden, 1997; Hazony, 2018).
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