The Battle of Kadesh was likely the largest chariot engagement in ancient military history, where chariot warfare battlefield tactics, techniques and procedures were skillfully employed by the Egyptians under Ramses II against the Hittites under Muwatallis. This conflict illustrated violent war chariots utilization, enemy decapitation strikes, hidden force deployments, surprise tactics, and the infantryman’s role in a cultural engagement occurring generations ago in antiquity. The conflict exposed why disinformation and personal leadership drove thousands of fighting men to their death during an epic battle for control of the Middle East.
Furthermore, The Battle of Kadesh was the culmination of years of military preparation and trial of strength between the Hittites and the Egyptians, in which elements of the celebrated principles of warfare were demonstrated in this conflict. The principles of war are military instructions for the conduct and prosecution of war and they consist of mass, maneuver, objective, offensive, security, simplicity, surprise, unity of command, and economy of force. The principles of surprise, security, offensive, and unity of command were the primary tenets operating in the battle of kadesh. In addition, while the combat weapons have evolved technologically, military tactics, battle strategy, and war doctrines have remain the same since the Battle of Kadesh.
BACKGROUND HISTORY
In 1275 BCE, the powerful and wealthy Egyptian kingdom under Pharaoh Ramses II (1303-1213 BCE) clashed in northern Syria with the militarily innovative Hittite Empire under Muwatallis. Kadesh was a rich and powerful fortified city that offered an excellent outpost to defend an empire, or to expand one from. Kadesh was a Hittite obstacle to Ramses’ efforts to make Egypt’s world supremacy claims, which was more than empty boasting. Egyptian chariots and light-armed infantry played hide-and-seek sanguinary games around the fortified city walls until finally an all-out clash resulted. Hittite cunning and technology were nearly too much for Egyptian numbers and organization. The conflict concluded with a tactical victory for the Egyptians and a strategic success for the Hittites, which ended with a draw.
KING RAMSES THE GREAT
Ramses II was the third ruler of the 19th Egyptian Dynasty. Ramses fought to regain the territory in Africa and western Asia that Egypt held during the 16th and 15th centuries BC. His principal opponents were the Hittites, a powerful people of Asia Minor, against whom he waged a long military campaign. Ramses became famous partly because his rule was distinguished by the construction of such monuments as the rock-hewn temple of Abû Simbel, the great hypostyle hall in the Temple of Amon at Al Karnak, and the mortuary temple at Thebes, known as the Ramesseum.
HITTITE AND EGYPTIAN WAR-CHARIOTS
Combined traditions at Kadesh led to war-chariot development that combined the two best differing fighting vehicle varieties that were hurled into the fray by Egyptian and Hittite military leaders. The Hittite chariots were either two or four wheeled vehicles that were pulled by either two or four warhorses guided by warriors. The extra horse power gave the heavier Hittite vehicles greater speed. In contrast, the Egyptian war-chariots were light and pulled by two warhorses, which facilitated Egyptian mobility and combat maneuverability.
BATTLEFIELD TACTICS
The Egyptian Army consisted of 2000 war-chariots and 18,000 infantrymen, while the Hittite Army consisted of 3000 war-chariots and 20,000 infantrymen. The Battle of Kadesh began when Ramses invaded Syria with four combat divisions and other supporting troops: Amun division, Re division, Seth division, and the newly formed Ptah division. The Egyptian Army consisted of chariots and foot soldiers.
Muwatallis created a large military coalition consisting of many chariots and infantry men derived from his vassal states. When the Hittite Army was hiding behind the city mound, Muwatallis sent out bogus intelligence reports saying that his army was at Aleppo, farther north. Because Ramses fell for the deception, he hurried his army toward Kadesh, his units stretched along the Orontes valley road. By evening, the king with the first division reached Kadesh and set up his camp with his Amon Division. Before the battle, two captured Hittite scouts confessed to the Egyptians the actual details of the Hittite strategy and here Ramses discovered that his forces were vulnerable to a surprise attack, but it was too late to save Ramses’ first division.
Suddenly, Mutwatallis launched his Hittitie war-chariots across the river where they attacked the Egyptian Ra division in the flank and they destroyed it completely. The Hittite Army almost achieved a decisive victory against the Egyptian Army, but their military personnel stopped to loot the enemy camp rather than continuing the offensive attack on the Egyptian Army. During the Hittite looting, Egyptian reinforcements arrived on the battlefield to assist Ramses and his troops in combat operations. When Ramses led a counter-attack against them, this assault placed the battle in the balance. Egyptian re-enforcements arrived from Amur-ru just in time to assist Ramses’ forces and they completely destroyed elements of the Hittite Army. Finally, Mutwatallis sent over more war-chariots, but they were repelled by the Egyptian Army’s re-enforcements and the Ptah division.
EGYPTIAN AND HITTITE VERSION OF KADESH BATTLE
The biased Egyptian version of the battle was recorded on numerous temples by Ramses, but a Hittite version excavated at Boghazköy has enabled a truer assessment of the battle. In addition, Hittite references to the battle have been found at Hattusa, although no annals have been discovered that might describe it as part of a campaign. Remses later signed a peace treaty with the Hittites which would forever place Kadesh out of Egyptian hands.
ANALYSIS: BATTLEFIELD AFTERMATH
Ramses reverses caused him to withdraw his remaining forces from the Kadesh region, while the Hittites had seen enough Egyptian military resources to concur with a lasting peace following the conflict. Ramses and Muwatallis demonstrated good and bad judgments during their conduct and prosecution of the conflict particularly in the area of central command; they both experienced failure in communication, and their leadership resulted in a tactical victory for the Egyptians and a strategic success for the Hittites, which was simply a draw.
Despite the propaganda records left by Ramses, the conflict was not a gigantic victory. Although Ramses was brave during battle, he ignored several significant warfare rules by separating his forces and not properly employing good reconnaissance and pre-battle intelligence. Ramses’ lack of good intelligence meant that he was always vulnerable to a surprise attack.
While the battle of Kadesh was a draw between the Egyptians and the Hittites, this engagement revealed the effective and ineffective utilization of the principle of surprise, security, offensive, and unity of command. Muwatallis executed the principle of surprise effectively by striking the Egyptian army at a time and place where Ramses did not expect. However, Muwatallis failed at procuring the principle of security when his Hittite spies were captured and force to reveal the Hittite plan of attack to Ramses. The Hittites failed to exploit the principle of offensive attack by looting the enemy camps. Although Ramses made mistakes in this b
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